Perryville
From Part 1, Bragg ordered Polk and Hardee to abandon an admirable position between Buell's army and Louisville at the Green River. However, despite this success, Bragg ordered his two corps to march away to the east towards Kirby Smith in the Lexington area and then turned command over to Polk as he "went on a tour of inspection" to Lexington! Here was yet another instance of poor leadership in the face of the enemy. The current term might be "Chickened Out"; in those days, likely "Bugged Out". Buell then marched into Louisville unopposed. Here he reorganized his army, admixing a large number of new recruits with his army's veterans. For every brigade of veterans, a 4th regiment was added, composed of recruits. His army rose to 61,000 and he quickly prepared his advance along four roads to east to south of Louisville to challenge Bragg. The road east would lead those troops against Cleburne who judiciously had retired to join Kirby Smith in Lexington and Versailles.
The next road, southeast, led to Harrodsburg. The third and fourth roads led south towards Perryville, both taken by Crittenden and Gilbert's Corps. Of course, Bragg assumed the wrong target: Frankfort and Lexington, and so he bolstered Kirby Smith's line to defend Versailles. Polk centred his corps about Harrodsburg and stretched westwards towards Hardee who in turn had stretched his corps westward on the Harrodsburg - Perryville Road.
Overnight, Bragg received a report of Federals northwest of Perryville, but he still clung to his assumption that Buell would advance his main force on Versailles. The morning of Oct 8 saw the Crittenden's Corps threatening to pass the left of the Confederate line towards Perryville. Hardee sent two brigades from Patton Anderson's Division southwest on the Harrodsburg-Perryville Road, crossing the Chaplin River, to face the Federal threat which was forming north of Doctor's Creek. Hardee ordered Buckner's Division to form on their right: the brigades of Liddell, Bushrod Johnson, Cleburne and Wood, along with the remaining two brigades of Anderson. These 6 brigades faced two of Rousseau's 5 brigades, Lytle and Harris's Brigades on the ridge above Doctor's Creek, largely dried up at this time of the year. Cheatham's Division of Polk's Corps came up on Hardee's right to face Rousseau's remaining 3 brigades: Terrill, Starkweather and Webster.
By 1 p.m., Bushrod Johnson with Adams of Patton Anderson's Division on his left became heavily engaged. Cleburne was ordered forward to Johnson's support when the latter ran low on ammunition. Against artillery and musket fire from his left and front, Cleburne led his men across the creek, past two famous homes still there: Squire Bottom and Widow Bottom, and continued up the ridge. Early in this advance, Cleburne was wounded just above the ankle and his horse was killed. As his men crested the ridge driving the Federals off, he was again wounded but stayed on the field until the battle ended. Fighting was also taking place on his left and right. Cheatham had successfully driven Terrill's and Starkweather's Brigades. But darkness ended the fighting and the Confederates camped on the ground won. Buell's loss was 4200; Bragg's 3400.
However, Bragg was vacillating again. He had been informed that Gilbert's 3rd Corps, unused on the 8th, was advancing unopposed south towards Perryville, entirely west of the battlefield. And so was Crittenden's 2nd Corps. He hence ordered Hardee and Polk to leave the field for Harrods-burg where Kirby Smith would join forces from Versailles. By October 10th his army was consolidated for the first time, all three corps totalling 47,000 men. Although arranged in a strong position facing west, Bragg again lost his nerve and ordered a retreat before being attacked. By October 26th, Bragg's army arrived at Knoxville, giving up on Kentucky. By train, most of the army continued their retreat to Chattanooga, giving up on Tennessee as well. Along with many in the army, Cleburne too had lost confidence in Bragg's generalship, failing as he had first in following up Cleburne's victory at Richmond and subsequently the Confederate position along the Green River, and the successes at Perryville.
Stones River: Murfreesboro
In mid-December 1862, Cleburne was finally given command of a division, Buckner's Division, and with it, the promotion to Major General. This was conferred upon him in person by President Davis in his visit to the army from December 12th to 14th. Although all senior officers endorsed this decision, especially influential was Hardee's endorsement. Even S.A.M. Wood and Bushrod Johnson (a Westpoint graduate), both of whom outranked him, concurred and continued to serve in his division. Cleburne's division consisted of brigades commanded by Lucius Polk (nephew of Leonidas Polk), Liddell's Arkansans, Johnson's Tennesseans, and Wood's Alabamian and Mississippi regiments.
Breckinridge's Division joined the army from Mississippi and was assigned to the Army of Tennessee. Kirby Smith had been detached with two of his four divisions. His remaining two divisions were reassigned. Hardee now commanded 3 divisions: Cleburne, Breckenridge and McCown. Polk commanded the 2nd Corps: Cheatham and Withers' Divisions. Bragg then led his army north to Murfreesboro, 1 ½ miles south of the Stones River. Buell had finally been replaced by Rosecrans who occupied Nashville, his supply base, 30 miles north of Murfreesboro.
On December 26th, Rosecrans 54,000 man army began its advance southward now facing 37,000 Confederates. Breckenridge formed his division just east of Stones River, which bent north just east of the Old Nashville Pike crossing. Cleburne's division with only three brigades was ordered to form a defensive line behind Breckenridge. His fourth brigade, commanded by Wood, was conducting a fighting withdrawal to slow the advance of McCook's Corps advancing south on the turnpike. Wood rejoined the division on the 29th. The Confederate line from Overall Creek west of the turnpike was covered by McCown, Hardee and Withers, with Cheatham's division behind Withers. Breckinridge and Cleburne lay east of the turnpike.
Bragg's plan was to advance with his left and swing to his right, driving Van Cleve's Division under Crittenden back on the Nashville Pike. Ironically, Rosecrans' plan for that same morning was to advance his left against Breckinridge and Cleburne, then swing to his right. Had the attacks gone in simultaneously, the two armies would have pirouetted 90 degrees! However, Bragg got going first and Rosecrans called off his attack.
On December 30th, the evening before the attack, Hardee ordered Cleburne's division to cross the pike and Stones River to form behind McCown's division. Crossing the river in the dark was difficult but, worse, they had to be ready to attack at 4:30 on the morning of 31st December: no sleep, wet and cold. His line, left to right was composed of Liddell, Johnson, Polk and Wood. On Cleburne's right flank would be an outcropping of rocks and cedars, occupied by Negley; his left flank faced open fields with fences and hedgerows, defended by McCook's Corps. The morning broke in a heavy fog and Cleburne's men never saw McCown's men who were supposed to be in his front. Taking fire from Van Cleve's Federals, Cleburne's men soon realized that they were in fact the front line. As they advanced, by order to swing towards his right, his left became exposed, but McNair's brigade of McCown's Division fortuitously appeared and came to his support.
McCook's first line broke in about 20 minutes, Davis and Johnson's brigades falling back on a second line. It too fell quickly and Cleburne's division continued its advance, still inclining to their right. But his right flank was now exposed to that large rock outcropping and cedar brake occupied in part by Sheridan's Division, the third in McCook's Corps. The fire from there forced Polk and Wood to realign, facing east. Eventually, the frontal attack on this cedar brake from the south by Withers and Cheatham drove the Federals back towards the pike, and Cleburne promptly inclined his line to the left, facing north for what is called his 4th engagement, north of the Wilkinson Pike. Again, he broke this line, and Liddell made a wide flanking move to the north where his brigade finally mounted a ridge overlooking the Nashville Pike. Below him he observed the Federal wagon train and supporting troops. His battery opened on the trains and Wheeler's cavalry attacked, scattering the wagons. Cleburne was working diligently to bring up the rest of his division in support. The time was about 3 p.m. His men had had almost no sleep the night before, no food or water all day and their ammunition wagons could not keep up. Slowly the division began to pull back, some less organized than others. However, Liddell's men were able to form a line along "the small dirt road" upon which the division rallied. Here their ammunition was replenished, and they awaited the inevitable counterattack. But it never came.
Hardee supported Cleburne's request to hold their ground, securing the 3 miles they had overrun during the day and securing the captured munitions, flags and wounded. In his after-battle report, Hardee noted his request just before noon for another division to take the place of Cleburne's exhausted division. "The commanding general replied he had none to give me." Clearly, Rosecrans had the advantage of interior lines - feeding brigades from his left to reinforce his right. This was especially true of his artillery. Cleburne had only 3 batteries for his four brigades with which to respond.
The next morning, January 1st, Hardee requested Cleburne to determine whether Rosecrans was withdrawing but not to bring on a general engagement. Cleburne sent Liddell on the same route as the previous afternoon and again he attained the same overlook. From here he could report that the enemy was not withdrawing. Wood had been ordered forward to protect Liddell's right, but this advance brought on the general engagement which Hardee had not desired, so Cleburne ordered Wood to withdraw. The order came almost too late, and Wood left 100 casualties on the field north of the Small Dirt Road. Cleburne then sent a note via Hardee to Bragg saying that the Federals in his front were fortifying their line and that an attack could endanger all the gains of yesterday and put the army at risk. The rest of January 1st was quiet.
However, Bragg was not quite finished. He ascertained that Breckinridge was threatened by a brigade of Federals on a hill just south of where the river bends back to the east, and that they should be dislodged. Despite protests from all the sector commanders, Bragg ordered Breckinridge to attack. His brigades were decimated by the flanking fire from the ridge on his left but especially by the 58 guns that Mendenhall had arranged. Breckenridge took 1800 casualties for no gain. Cleburne's only contribution was Semple's battery of 4 guns. Of the 45 men in his battery, 20 were killed or wounded.
Cleburne was ordered that night to recross the river and position himself behind Breckinridge's weakened division. Here they and the army awaited the inevitable order to retreat which came the next day: 3rd of January. Welcome to 1863!
Tullahoma Campaign
Bragg's retreat from Murfreesboro ended on January 6th north of Tullahoma behind a range of hills called Highland Rim. Rosecrans remained at Murfreesboro, 35 miles north, establishing winter quarters.
The Southern press was very critical of Bragg's retreat, stating that their sources were the staff of general officers. Bragg then sent a letter to his generals asking for their support. Here are excerpts from Cleburne's written response:
"I have consulted with all my brigade commanders at this place as you request - showing them your letter and enclosures, and they write with me in personal regard for yourself, in a high appreciation of your patriotism and gallantry and in a conviction of your great capacity for organization, but at the same time, they see, with regret, and it has also met my observation, that you do not possess the confidence of the Army, in other respect, in that degree necessary to secure success."
Point made!
Hardee went further stating, after consulting with Cleburne and Polk, that they
"agreed a change in the command of the army was necessary."
President Davis sent Beauregard to Bragg's headquarters in Tullahoma to consult but his conclusion was that Bragg stay in command.
Bragg's army had wintered 10 miles north of Tullahoma and just south of the aforenamed ridge, Highland Rim. It was perforated by 5 gaps: west to east Guy's and Bell Buckle Gaps west of the pike to Tullahoma covered by Polk's Corps and, to the east, Liberty Gap, Hoover's Gap and Matt's Hollow, defended by Hardee's Corps. Three of Cleburne's regiments covered the villages of Bellbuckle and Wartrace, south of the Liberty Gap; Liddell was placed north of these gaps, serving as an early warning brigade. Hoover's Gap was 5 miles east of Liberty Gap, covered by Bate's Brigade.
Rosecrans' army of 60,000 was composed of Thomas' 14th, Alexander McCook's 20th, Crittenden's 21st, and Granger's Reserve Corps. His cavalry was commanded by MG Stanley, 12,000 strong. Rosecrans started south on April 23, 1863. He feinted towards Shelbyville, west of the pike, and Liberty Gap, but his real target was Hoover's Gap, 5 miles east, and an end-run with Granger's Corps around the east end of the ridge.
Bragg had 47,000 defenders.
Polk's Corps: Cheatham, McCown, Breckenridge
Hardee's Corps: Cleburne, Stewart (including Bate's Brigade)
Cavalry: Wheeler's Corps (9,000) and Forrest's Division (4,000).
Well-known to us was the advance of Federal Col. Wilder, commanding the Lightning Brigade, mounted but armed with Spencer repeating rifles. Their intended use was as dismounted infantry, just like Buford at Gettysburg. Despite 17 days of continuous rain in late June, on June 24th, his brigade struggled through Hoover's Gap and came upon Bates' Brigade of Stewart's Division, on a ridge just south of McBride Creek. Wilder deployed his 4 regiments: the Indiana 17th, 72nd and 75th, and the Illinois 98th, supported by Ely Lilly's battery. With their firepower, they forced the gap and set up a defensive ring south of the gap to ward off the expected counterattack. Bates' Brigade did just that but his TN20 suffered a terrible loss against the continuous fire from Wilder's seven-shot repeating rifles, as did Bates' other regiments. That counterattack cost his brigade 25%: 146 out of 650. Wilder's Brigade, the attackers, lost only 51 men out of 1200. A bit lopsided, you might note! Finally Thomas' other regiments, slogging through the mud, fed slowly into Wilder's line securing the southern end of Hoover's Gap.
Not so well known was the push by McCook's Corps through Liberty Gap against Cleburne, specifically Liddell and Wood, incurring losses of 121 men. But here too the Federals emerged from the south end of Liberty Gap, threatening Wartrace.
On Jun 27th, with McCook just south of Liberty Gap and Thomas just south of Hoover's Gap, and now Granger threatening from the eastern flank, Bragg had to order another withdrawal to Tullahoma. But Rosecrans again flanked Tullahoma, and Bragg continued his retreat south, ending at Chattanooga.
On July 4th 1863, Lee's retreat from Gettysburg, Pemberton's surrender of Vicksburg, and Bragg's retreat from Knoxville, surrendering his hold on Tennessee, had to make this the worst day of the war for the Confederacy.
On July 6th and 7th Cleburne, serving as Bragg's rear guard as usual, crossed the Tennessee at Kelly's Ford, 9 miles downstream from Chattanooga. He was then ordered upstream, east of the Chattanooga to guard the railroad towards Knoxville which Burnside now occupied. On Jul 14th, following the surrender of Vicksburg, Hardee escaped from Bragg's army, joining Joe Johston at Jackson MS. It had been occupied by the Confederates following the loss of Vicksburg. Cleburne was assigned the corps until D.H. Hill arrived from the east. On Jul 10, Davis had promoted D.H. Hill to Lieutenant General and ordered him west to serve under Bragg. Lee had asked for him to be transferred from the Army of Northern Virginia. Hill would command the divisions of Cleburne and Breckinridge.
On Aug 31, Rosecrans troops crossed the Tennessee at Bridgeport and headed immediately into Wills Valley, west of Lookout Mountain, hence shielded from Bragg in Chattanooga. Advancing south, Rosecrans could cross at any of several passes to the south of Chattanooga, in position to cut off Bragg's line of supply, communication and retreat. On discovering this move, Bragg quickly abandoned Chattanooga via the LaFayette Road.
McLemore's Cove
On September 7, with Cleburne in the lead, Bragg's army headed south the 26 miles to LaFayette. His army encamped between Lee and Gordon Mills south to LaFayette. Holding back the brigades of Poke and Deshler in LaFayette, Cleburne sent Woods' Brigade southwest into Pidgeon Mountain to clear and hold Dug Gap. This gap led into McLemore's Cove. On Sep 9, two of Thomas' Federal divisions were pouring over the gap in Lookout Mountain into this cove, intent on cutting off Bragg's retreat south.
Meantime, Bragg saw an advantage, envisioning Hindman entering the cove from the north and Cleburne from the east to outnumber and defeat these troops: the divisions of Negley and Baird, totalling about 12,000 men. Hindman had received the order from Bragg to advance at 4:30 a.m. on Sep 11, but he did not respond. Cleburne's 3 brigades were now through Dug Gap, awaiting the sounds of Hindman's fight before advancing on the Federal right flank, but all was for not. Hindman finally advanced late that afternoon, but by then the Federals had smelled a rat and had quickly withdrawn back to their mountain pass. The Confederate opportunity had evaporated. Bragg was incensed, of course but, in this case, he had a right to be.
Chickamauga
Rosecrans realized that his 3 corps were too far spread to support each other. McCook was about 20 miles south of Thomas and Crittenden was north of Bragg's army. Crittenden was the most vulnerable, then drawn up just north of Lee and Gordon Mills, and he was now in Bragg's sights. On Sep 18th, Bragg ordered his army north to Lee and Gordon Mills. Slowly the Confederates wrapped around the Federal's east flank as Thomas' corps was coming in from the west.
Bushrod Johnson crossed the Chickamauga Creek at Reed's Bridge and advanced south, opening Lambert's Ford, Alexander Bridge and Thedford Ford so Bushrod Johnson could be reinforced west of the creek.
The next evening, on Sep 19, close to sunset, Cleburne's Division under D.H. Hill, was ordered to cross Thedford's Ford and attack towards the Lafayette Road. He pushed the Federal line back 1 ½ miles in the dark, no mean feat. Of this advance, Hill stated
"I have never seen troops behave more gallantly than did this noble division, and certainly I never saw so little straggling from the field."
Overnight, Longstreet arrived and, at great risk, Bragg reorganized his army into two wings: Polk on the north and Longstreet on the south. This change in command structure taking place overnight meant that staff could not easily find and report for orders from their new commanders. D.H. Hill became a victim of this circumstance. Bragg's order to attack at dawn on Sep 20 was going to be difficult to coordinate. Polk's order to attack at dawn was sent simultaneously to Cleburne and Breckinridge but their corps commander, Hill, never received the order. This source of confusion delayed the attack until mid-morning but it went badly for several other reasons. Thomas' Federals had been erecting breastworks thoroughout the night. Hill's two divisions were stretched over a long line in heavy woods, with no reserves. Advances were made by a brigade, or even a regiment but, with no coordination, each unit's flanks were exposed and, after absorbing many losses, each unit fell back. Federal artillery had been well placed and also took their toll as did the infantry.
The heavy attack on Rosecrans' north flank had convinced him to send reinforcements north, specifically Wood's Division, the result of which was a large hole in the middle of his right (southern) wing. And here comes Longstreet led by Hood's division. That hole was exploited vigorously and Rosecrans' right collapsed. Generals Rosecrans, Crittenden and McCook fled back to Chattanooga with many of their troops.
However Thomas, on the north end, commanded a fighting withdrawal to cover his right flank and rear, and he established a line on the crest of Snodgrass Hill, also called Horseshoe Hill. Cleburne and Breckinridge were ordered to charge this new line. They succeeded at great cost and the Federals at nightfall retreated in panic north to the Rossville Gap and Chattanooga. However, this great victory was lost on Bragg who did not understand what his troops had achieved. In fact, even the next day, he refused to followup this victory by pressing the Federals back into Chattanooga before they had a chance to recover and build defensive lines.
Chattanooga
Starting the night of Sep 21-22, Bragg began his investment of Rosecrans' army in Chattanooga, estabishing a line along Missionary Ridge to the east of the town, his entrenchments built along the base of Missionary Ridge. But he didn't have sufficient numbers to reach the Tennesee River. From Rossville Gap at the south end of Missionary Ridge, his line continued west anchoring on the base of Lookout Mountain. Rosecrans Federals were surrounded. Cleburne's division was placed about 3 miles south of the Tennessee River, the right flank of Bragg's Missionary Ridge line. A two-month seige began.
Ongoing complaints on Bragg's generalship compelled Pres. Davis to again visit Bragg's Headquarters on Oct 9. Here, every commander expressed the need to replace Bragg, but Davis would not abandon his friend. Instead, D.H. Hill was relieved of command, Leonidus Polk was posted to Mississippi, and Forrest was promoted to Major General and sent to the Mississippi as well. All this resulted in Hardee being posted back under Bragg's command. Way to go Davis!
Meantime, the Federals were not idle. Although beseiged, over the next two months, Grant orchestrated their rescue. Rosecrans was replaced by Thomas as commander of the Army of the Cumberland. The 11th and 12th Corps from Meade's Army of the Potomac were sent west under Hooker. When they finally arrived, they crossed downstream at Bridgeport. From Vicksburg, Sherman was now leading 4 additional divisions to the rescue. Aware that Burnside's occupation of Knoxville, Bragg perceived him as a threat from the east, and he detached Longstreet with 15,000 men to defeat him. On Nov 22, Cleburne was also dispatched to Knoxville on the railroad, with the proviso that Longstreet would send him back if not desperately needed.
However, the next day, Bragg sent an urgent message to Cleburne, ordering his return to the north end of Missionary Ridge along with the division of Buckner, both to be under Cleburne's command. The morning of Nov 25, Thomas began his attack in the centre, taking the entrenchments at the base of Missionary Ridge. On the north end of the ridge, Sherman had arranged 4 divisions on the flank Missionary Ridge. They were drawn from Jeff Davis's Division with Sherman's Army of the Tennessee and Howard's 11th Corps.
Only Cleburne's command blocked Sherman's advance. Amongst the broken hills leading to the Tennessee River was a railroad tunnel connecting Chattanooga and Knoxville. Cleburne dubbed the hill over it as Tunnel Hill, and this would be the anchor of Bragg's right flank. His line had been assailed on the 24th but the real attack came on Nov 25 when Sherman commanded six Federal divisions facing Cleburne's single division. Sherman's attack however was executed by only 6 brigades and 3 regiments from Howard's Corps. They formed two long lines, the ends of which were beyond Cleburne's thin line on the crest of Tunnel Hill, held by only 4 brigades: Smith's Texans at the apex, with Lewis (Bate's Division) supporting his right and Brown's (Stevenson Division) supporting Cleburne's left. The issue for the Confederates became one of attrition and ammunition after 3 or 4 hours of fighting. Brig Gen Smith was wounded and Col. Granbury was given command of the Texas Brigade. Hardee, observing from the northern crest of Missionary Ridge, ordered Stevenson to send Cumming's brigade to reinforce Cleburne's hardpressed brigades. After another hour of slugging it out, Cumming suggested to Cleburne a bayonet charge by two of his Georgia regiments to force the issue. Cleburne augmented the order by adding one of his own regiments to the charge. With a rebel yell, 3 regiments rushed down Tunnel Hill's north slope, driving the Federals off the mountain and across the valley below. Cleburne was at the front, ensuring that supporting troops were called up to support the attack. Does this remind you of Chamberlain ordering a bayonet charge by 20th Maine on Little Round Top? Cleburne's command saved the day against overwhelming odds and Hardee witnessed it. His losses were only 42/178/2 = 222. The Federal loss was 1,300.
However, the day was lost when, in the centre of Bragg's line, a frontal attack up Missionary Ridge by Thomas's regiments broke through the line on the crest. Hooker, having seized Lookout Mountain, now crossed the valley and threatened to cut off the Confederate escape route via the Rossville Gap.
Hardee ordered a general retreat down the reverse slope of Missionary Ridge. Cleburne, now commanding his own and the divisions of Stevenson and Walker, crossed Chickamauga Creek in their rear and headed south east. The retreat was of course a nightmare. Roads were deep in mud and the wagon train had to be protected by, guess who, Cleburne's Division.
Ringgold
At Ringgold Gap just north of Dalton, Bragg ordered Cleburne's weakened division to hold the advance of Hooker's Corps, 16,000 strong. At stake was the railroad south, the rear of the retreating army and the wagon trains.
On Nov 27, Hooker attacked. Cleburne had placed his brigades astride Ringgold Gap. Hooker probed Cleburne's left, west of the gap, but the main thrust was on the ridge to the east. Here, Lucius Polk from his reserve position (1/2 strength) had alertly sent two of his four regiments to the crest just in time to thwart the Federals and hurl them back. The Federals renewed the assault but by now Lowrey had been ordered to the crest. Heavy fighting ensued but Lowrey and Polk held. Some of the defenders were even throwing rocks! The contribution of the 1st Arkansas regiment was particularly noted. Cleburne's report stated
"This was the most glorious triumph I ever witnessed on a battle field."
Cleburne's attention was now drawn to his left flank, Govan's Brigade, but here Hooker's thrust was again stopped. By noon, Hardee sent word that the trains were safe and Cleburne was free to withdraw. Cleburne had selected a second defensive line on Dick's Ridge about 1 mile south of the Ringgold Gap and withdrew to that line about 2 p.m. Hooker's men followed but did not attack.
Cleburne's loss that day: 20/190/11 = 221, remarkably only 5% of division strength of 4,157. His brigade strengths were BG Polk - 545; BG Lowrey - 1,330; Col Granbury's Texans - 1,266; and Col Govan (Liddell on leave) - 1,016.
Two and a half months later, on February 9, 1864, the Confederate congress adopted a resolution:
"to Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne, and the officers and men under his command, for the victory obtained by them over superior forces of the enemy at Ringgold Gap, in the State of Georgia, on the 27th day of Novermber, 1863, by which the advance of the enemy was impeded, our wagon train and most of our artillery saved, and a large number of the enemy killed and wounded" and that "the President be requested to communicate the foregoing resolution to Major-General Cleburne and his command."
A monument to Cleburne stands atop Ringgold Gap.
Presenter and Editor: Paul Van Nest
The War in the West is an epic study for the club, taking up 4 of our 2026 sessions. Above is part 2 (Perryville to winter quarters at Dalton Georgia). Our June meeting will start with the Atlanta Campaign from Dalton to Atlanta, followed by the five battles of Atlanta under Hood. Part 4 will finish this series, given at our first meeting in the Fall: Sep 10 (2nd Thursday in September to get away from Labour Day). We'll start with Confederate loss at Jonesboro and Sherman's occupation of Atlanta. But what will Hood's battered army do now? Spoiler alert: our friend General Cleburne won't make it Nashville where Hood's army will be annihilated in December 1864.
The American Battlefield Trust (ABT) has now preserved more than 60,000 acres since its earliest incarnation: APCWS in 1988, to the end of 2025. This past year the total was 2,015 acres in 29 battlefields. Below is the list showing those that I have talked about or will, those where Cleburne fought.
And remember, the ABT is not just about preserving battlefield lands but also about interpreting and establishing trails to guide us in our visits. Will we get back to our battlefields in 2029?
